(Tuesday, 22nd May 2007)
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The empirical implementation of oligopoly models is becoming increasingly complex and sophisticated, and have great potential for practical application to questions of competition policy. Detailed models of specific industrial settings have produced useful insights into market design, deregulation, merger analysis, and vertical integration. This lecture will discuss some general modeling frameworks and techniques. I will also drawn upon detailed examples of specific implementations from the electricity industry.
Bibliographical references :
James B. Bushnell, Erin T. Mansur, and Celeste Saravia (2005), "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets".
UCEI working paper. http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/csemwp126r.pdf
Severin Borenstein and James Bushnell. (1999) "An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Market." Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol 47, No. 3.
Working paper version : http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/bushnell/pwp044r2.pdf
James Bushnell (2005), "Looking for Trouble: Competition Policy in the U.S. Electricity Industry.Chapter 6 in Electricity Restructuring: Choices and Challenges".
in S. Puller and J. Griffen, Eds. University of Chicago Press.
(early version linked here : http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/csemwp109.pdf)
