Electoral influence can take different shapes. While advertising, media and political speeches may be means of persuading voters, in less institutionalized democracies there may be "other forms" of influencing voting behavior. One recurring question is how to allocate campaign funds (across states/districts) in order to maximize vote shares. Would the answer change if we allow for vote buying (i.e. clientelism)? Also, do political parties and politicians have other "non-formal" ways to influence electoral outcomes? Do parties choose organizational forms that maximize their vote shares? We will explore the theories of distributive politics and vote buying and review some of the empirical political economy literature. Moreover, we will briefly go over non-formal and organizational aspects of elections and clientelism.

Literature:

Dixit and Londregan (1995, APSR) Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency

Casas (2018, APSR). Distributive Politics with Vote and Turnout Buying.

Finan and Schechter (2012, Econometrica). Vote buying and reciprocity.

Gans-Morse et al (2014, APSR). Machine Politics During Elections.

Dekel et al (2008, JPE). Vote buying: General Elections.