By Carlos Pereira, Professor of Political Institutions and Public Policy at Getulio Vargas Foundation – FGV, Rio de Janeiro

In many presidential democracies, the existence of fragmented multiparty systems encourages directly elected executives to share power and other resources via the construction of interparty coalition alliances. This form of governance, now given the name of “coalitional presidentialism,” is notably under theorized. In the comparative literature and in the existing theoretical models, coalitional presidentialism occupies an ill-defined space between classic works on U.S. presidentialism (where unipartisan governments are the norm) and on European parliamentarism (in which multiparty cabinets are routine, but in which is there is no directly elected executive and the functioning of governments is distinct from multiparty presidentialism). Yet empirically, coalitional presidentialism is becoming increasingly common: it is now the modal form of democratic governance in Latin America, and analogous regimes exist in Africa, Asia, and post-communist Europe as well. This workshop will address and discuss coalition tools presidents in multiparty environments may strategically manage in order to build and sustain majority coalitions intertemporally in new democracies.

Checks and balance institutions (Judiciary, public prosecutors, audit courts etc.) have imposed huge political and judicial loses to several corrupt political elites in Latin America. Considering the huge political polarization in the region, the role of ideology on the approval of coordinated action by controlling institutions has important consequences for the fight against corruption. Voters evaluate the benefits of coordination as outweighing their costs, even if such actions weaken defendants’ rights. Voters’ engagement, in fact, depends on congruency with the court decision. Preliminary results of this research agenda suggest that If the court convicts the voter’s rejected candidate, confidence in the court’s decision increases. However, if the court convicts voters’ preferred candidates, the willingness to oppose corruption vanishes, and the political persecution argument emerges. Voters did not manifest any inclination to leave their preferred candidate behind in the quest to punish corruption. That is, voter’s perception of coordinated initiatives by accountability actors may not be free from ideological bias.