(Tuesday, 1st January 2002)
The lecture will present a survey to focus on what is relational contracting, according to Mc Neil, Golberg, Williamson and others. Then it will develop the relational contracting within and between firms according to Levin, Baker Gibbons and Murphy. Relational and formal contracts are then analysed as being complement or substitutes according to Poppo et Zenger, Zenger.
Bibliographical references :
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, K.J. Murphy (2000), "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm" Working Paper Graduate School of Business, Harvard University.
Brousseau, E., Fares, M. (2000) "Incomplete Contracts and Governance Structures: Are Incomplete Contract Theory and New Institutional Economics Substitutes or Complements?" in C. Ménard (eds.), Institutions, Contracts and Organization : Perspectives from New Institutional Economics Edward Elgar, pp. 399-421.
Hviid, M. (2000), "Long-Term Contracts and Relational Contracts" in B.Bouckaert, G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, pp. 46-72.
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., Woodruff, C. (2000), "Courts and Relational Contracts" Working Paper graduate school of international relations and pacific studies, UCSD.
(Wednesday, 1st January 2003)
The aim of this workshop is to analyze how the recent analysis of complementarities à la Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Holmström and Milgrom (1994), can contributes to a better understanding of organizational and contractual design. This literature highlights the fact that economic organizations should be analyzed as a system of coherent attributes. In the workshop, I will develop the economics of complementarity, focusing first on the mathematical concept of supermodularity and then developing its applications for the economics of organization. Empirical analysis trying to assess the extent of complementarities among attributes will also be presented with a particular emphasis on estimation challenges and econometric solutions.
Bibliographical references :
Must read reference : Cockburn, I., Henderson, R. and S. Stern (2000), "Balancing Incentives: The Tension between Basic and Applied Research”, working paper, MIT, Sloan School of Business.
Athey, S., S. Stern (1998), "An Empirical Framework for Testing Theories about Complementarities in Organizational Design", NBER working paper 6600.
Brickley, J. (1999), "Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising", Journal of Law & Economics, 42(2), 745-774
Holmström, B., P. Milgrom (1994), "The Firm as an Incentive System", American Economic Review, 84, 972-991.
Ichniowski, C.K., K. Shaw and G. Prennushi (1997), "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity", American Economic Review, 87(3), 291-313.
(Thursday, 1st January 2004)
The lecture will present a survey to focus on what is relational contracting, according to Mc Neil, Golberg, Williamson and others. Then it will develop the relational contracting within and between firms according to Levin, Baker Gibbons and Murphy. Relational and formal contracts are then analysed as being complement or substitutes according to Poppo and Zenger, Zenger.
Bibliographical references :
Poppo L. & T.R. Zenger (2002), "Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements?", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23, No. 8.
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K. J. Murphy (2002), "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 39-84.
Levin J. (2003), "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3): 835–847.
Corts, K. S. & J. Singh (2004), "The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 20, No. 1.
Johnson, S., J. McMillan & C. Woodruff (2002), "Courts and Relational Contracts", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1.
