(Wednesday, 20th May 2009)
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The purpose of this workshop is to introduce students to laboratory experiments and to their use in the analysis of institutions. We will overview the main advantages of experimental methods and theory drawbacks, how institutions are modelled in these contexts and the results obtained in the literature.
Bibliographical references :
Fehr, Ernst and Gachter, Simon, 2000."Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments", American Economic Review 90(4), September, 980-994.
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp010.pdf
Peeters, Ronald, Vorsatz, Marc, and Walzi, Markus, 2007. "Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender-Receiver Games," working paper.
http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=9158
Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game," Games and Economic Behavior, October, 61(1), 86-112.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4N7YGK9-1/2/a89ab6f6ef784e0458aeb708877485e6
(Monday, 16th May 2011)
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This workshop will explore several rational explanations for the ocurrence and prevalence of wars and conflicts, with special emphasis on explanations based on informational problems. The main thesis will be that conflict and peaceful bargaining, rather than being mutually exclusive, are the two sides of the same coin. We will examine the economic literature on this topic, both theoretical and empirical, but making reference also to arguments coming from Political Science and Sociology.
Bibliographical references :
"Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information", Santiago Sanchez-Pages, Forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict.
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The Reasons for Wars – an Updated Survey", Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli, forthcoming in the Handbook on the Political Economy of War.
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