Across national and local governments, electoral turnover shapes bureaucratic governance and economic outcomes through competing forces. On the one hand, it can lead to personnel instability and policy uncertainty, factors that may hinder good governance and economic performance. Recent research highlights the significance of these dynamics, particularly in institutional settings characterized by weak civil service protections, where turnover enables patronage appointments and weakens merit-based selection. On the other hand, overly rigid bureaucracies risk developing organizational inertia and a "business as usual" culture. Insufficient bureaucratic turnover may also lead to growing ideological misalignment between elected officials and unelected bureaucrats over time, making it harder for elected leaders to enact meaningful policy change. From this perspective, regular political and bureaucratic turnover might also revitalize public administrations, particularly in democratic systems where newly elected leaders face strong incentives to perform. This lecture will explore emerging research in applied economics on the political and economic consequences of turnover induced by elections, drawing on cross-country data and case studies from Brazil, Indonesia, and the US.