(Thursday, 1st January 2004)
The lecture will present a survey to focus on what is relational contracting, according to Mc Neil, Golberg, Williamson and others. Then it will develop the relational contracting within and between firms according to Levin, Baker Gibbons and Murphy. Relational and formal contracts are then analysed as being complement or substitutes according to Poppo and Zenger, Zenger.
Bibliographical references :
Poppo L. & T.R. Zenger (2002), "Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements?", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23, No. 8.
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K. J. Murphy (2002), "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 39-84.
Levin J. (2003), "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3): 835–847.
Corts, K. S. & J. Singh (2004), "The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 20, No. 1.
Johnson, S., J. McMillan & C. Woodruff (2002), "Courts and Relational Contracts", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1.
