Barak Richman
Duke University

Richman

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(Wednesday, 18th May 2016)

Title : Stateless Commerce

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This lecture will examines private ordering institutions in the modern economy. It focuses on a particular case study: ethnic trading networks that organize the diamond industry’s distribution network. It will examine implications for private and public governance, competition policy, and the stability of private ordering over time.

Bibliographical references :

Must read reference : Barak Richman, "Stateless Commerce" (forthcoming 2017)

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"Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering," Columbia Law Review, vol.104 (December 2004)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=565464

"How Communities Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York" Law and Social Inquiry, vol.31 (Spring 2006).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=349040

"Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry," in Legal Certainty Beyond the State (Hart Publishing, 2008) (Volkmar Gessner, ed.)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=949467

"The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal" Virginia Law Review, vol.95 (April 2009)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1132483

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