(Tuesday, 1st January 2002)
The lecture will present a survey to focus on what is relational contracting, according to Mc Neil, Golberg, Williamson and others. Then it will develop the relational contracting within and between firms according to Levin, Baker Gibbons and Murphy. Relational and formal contracts are then analysed as being complement or substitutes according to Poppo et Zenger, Zenger.
Bibliographical references :
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, K.J. Murphy (2000), "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm" Working Paper Graduate School of Business, Harvard University.
Brousseau, E., Fares, M. (2000) "Incomplete Contracts and Governance Structures: Are Incomplete Contract Theory and New Institutional Economics Substitutes or Complements?" in C. Ménard (eds.), Institutions, Contracts and Organization : Perspectives from New Institutional Economics Edward Elgar, pp. 399-421.
Hviid, M. (2000), "Long-Term Contracts and Relational Contracts" in B.Bouckaert, G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, pp. 46-72.
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., Woodruff, C. (2000), "Courts and Relational Contracts" Working Paper graduate school of international relations and pacific studies, UCSD.
