(Wednesday, 20th May 2009)
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The purpose of this workshop is to introduce students to laboratory experiments and to their use in the analysis of institutions. We will overview the main advantages of experimental methods and theory drawbacks, how institutions are modelled in these contexts and the results obtained in the literature.
Bibliographical references :
Fehr, Ernst and Gachter, Simon, 2000."Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments", American Economic Review 90(4), September, 980-994.
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp010.pdf
Peeters, Ronald, Vorsatz, Marc, and Walzi, Markus, 2007. "Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender-Receiver Games," working paper.
http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=9158
Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game," Games and Economic Behavior, October, 61(1), 86-112.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4N7YGK9-1/2/a89ab6f6ef784e0458aeb708877485e6
