(Thursday, 21st May 2009)
Political institutions create the policies which govern the shape of the playing field on which firms compete. These decisions can have a profound effect on the profitability of firms. Because of this, the study of political institutions must go beyond understanding how policies affect competitiveness; it should examine how these policies are crafted and how the very firms that are governed by these laws and regulations attempt to influence shape of those same rules.
In this lecture, I will review the structure of policy making institutions and explore how firms and organized interests try to influence these institutions to their advantage. I will discuss the state of the current literature, common problems with current research, and open avenues for future investigation.
Bibliographical references :
Essential Literature Review Reference: de Figueiredo, John M. 2009. “Integrated Political Strategy,” Advances in Strategic Management, forthcoming.
Theoretical model: Baron, David P. 1999. “Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics,” Business and Politics 1(1): 1-31.
Empirical Model: Ansolabehere, Stephen, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder (2003). “Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17: 105-130.
Theory and Empirical: Laryczower, Matias Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi (2006). Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation. American Political Science Review, 100:85-97.
Theory and Empirical: de Figueiredo, John M. and Charles M. Cameron. 2009. “Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence,” UCLA and Princeton University Working Paper.
Empirical Model: Fisman, Ray. 2001. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections,” American Economic Review 91: 1095-1102.
