(Monday, 21st May 2007)
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Coordination problems are pervasive in economic and social interactions. In a variety of settings, “institutions” have emerged to address these problems and allow more efficient outcomes. In this workshop, I will review how simple game theoretic tools (such as the prisoners’ dilemma) have been used in the literature to address different aspects of this process, and what insights we have gained from this literature. These aspects include (see more references in Sánchez-Pagés and Straub, 2007):
Bibliographical references :
Must read reference : Sánchez-Pagés Santiago and Stéphane Straub. The emergence of institutions. Mimeo, University of Edinburgh.
Must read reference :
http://ideas.repec.org/p/edn/esedps/148.html
Bardhan, P.K. 2005. Scarcity, conflicts and cooperation: essays in the political and institutional economics of development. Massachusetts: MIT Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
Dixit Avinash. 2004. Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance. Princeton University Press.
(Chapter 1 available at http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7729.html)
Durlauf, S. and M. Fafchamps. 2006. Social Capital. In Handbook of Economic Growth, P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, Eds., North Holland: Amsterdam.
http://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/grochp/1-26.html
Greif, A. 1993. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition. American Economic Review, 83, 525-48.
Milgrom, P., D. North and B. Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs. Economics and Politics, 1, 1-23.
